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Abstract. This paper is devoted to Poincare´’s work in probability. Though the
subject does not represent a large part of the mathematician’s achievements, it
provides significant insight into the evolution of Poincare´’s thought on several
important matters such as the changes in physics implied by statistical mechan-
ics and molecular theories. After having drawn the general historical context of
this evolution, I focus on several important steps in Poincare´’s texts dealing
with probability theory, and eventually consider how his legacy was developed
by the next generation.
Introduction
In 1906, Poincare´ signed one of the most unusual texts of his scientific career [1], a
report written for the Cour de Cassation in order to eventually close the Dreyfus
case. In 1904, ten years after the arrest and the degradation of the unfortunate
captain, the French government decided to bring an end to this lamentable story
which had torn French society apart for years, and obtained the rehabilitation of
the young officer who had been so unjustly martyred. As is well known, Dreyfus
was convicted of treason in 1894 in the absence of any material proof, during a
rushed and unbalanced trial orchestrated by the military hierarchy, whose aim was
to identify a culprit as soon as possible. The only concrete document submitted as
evidence by the prosecution was the famous bordereau, found in a wastepaper basket
in the German Embassy in Paris and briefly scrutinized by several more or less
competent experts. Among them, Alphonse Bertillon played a specially sinister role
and became Dreyfus’ most obstinate accuser. He built a bizarre, scientific-sounding
theory of self-forgery of the bordereau, purporting to prove Dreyfus’ guilt. Bertillon
became trapped by his own theoretical construction, more because of overweening
self-confidence and stupidity than by a real partisan spirit. When the Affair broke
out at the end of the 1890s, and the political plot became obvious and Dreyfus’
innocence apparent, Bertillon continued to elaborate his theory, rendering it more
and more complex. This frenzy of elaboration brought him an avalanche of trouble,
and nearly put an end to his career in the Paris police department. However, for
the trial in the Cour de Cassation, in order to silence the last dissenting voices
which might be raised, it was decided not to ignore Bertillon’s rantings, but to ask
incontestable academic authorities to give their opinion about the possible value
of the self-proclaimed expert’s conclusions. Three mathematicians were called for
that purpose, Paul Appell, Gaston Darboux and Henri Poincare´, who jointly signed
the report for the Cour de Cassation in 1906. Nevertheless, it was well known that
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only the latter worked on the document, a tedious task Poincare´ that undertook with
integrity, but somewhat grudgingly. Besides, this was not Poincare´’s first intervention
in the Dreyfus case: during the judicial review of 1899 in Rennes of the decision of
1894, Painleve´ read a letter of Poincare´ criticizing Bertillon’s work for its lack of
scientific foundation.
This story is well known and has been narrated in detail many times ([52], [53],
[81]) and I shall not dwell on it further. However, one may ask why it was Poincare´
who was called upon to carry out this task. The first answer that comes to mind
is the following: in 1906, Poincare´, who was then fifty-two years old, was without
a doubt the most prominent among French scientists. He had, moreover, another
characteristic: his name was familiar to a sizeable audience outside the scientific
community. It was well known that he had been awarded the important prize of the
Swedish king Oscar II in 1889; the publication of popular books on the philosophy
of science increased his name recognition, and he was also famous due to several
essays published in newspapers, for instance during the International Congress of
Mathematicians in Paris in 1900, over which Poincare´ presided. To seek out such a
person in order to crush the insignificant but noisy Bertillon was therefore a logical
calculation on the government’s part. However, a second and more hidden reason
probably played a part as well. The report for the Cour de Cassation [1] opens with
a chapter whose title was quite original in the judicial litterature: Notions on the
probability of causes; it contains a brief exposition of the principles of the Bayesian
method. Bertillon had indeed pretended to build his system on the methods and
results of the theory of probability, and answering him was only possible by con-
fronting the so-called expert with his own weapons. It was therefore necessary not
only to seek out a scientific celebrity for the job, but also someone whose authority in
these matters could not be challenged. In 1906, Poincare´ was regarded by everyone
as the leading specialist in the mathematics of randomness in France. While by then
he was no longer the Sorbonne Chair of Calculus of Probability and Mathematical
Physics, he had held the Chair for some ten years (it was in fact the first position he
obtained in Paris), had accomplished an impressive amount of work in mathemati-
cal physics during this period (we shall return at length to this subject later), and
had published in 1896, shortly before leaving the chair, a treatise on the Calculus
of Probability which, in 1906, was still the main textbook on the subject in French.
Moreover, several texts had presented his thoughts on the presence of randomness in
modern physics to a large cultivated audience, in particular his Science and Hypoth-
esis ([71]), which went through several editions. It was therefore as a specialist in
the calculus of probability that Poincare´ was sought out by the judicial authorities,
in order to dispose of the Dreyfus case once and for all.
If we go back in time fifteen years before this event, we notice a striking contrast.
Since 1886, although Poincare´ held the aforementioned Sorbonne chair, he had prob-
ably mainly seen in the chair’s title the words Mathematical Physics. In 1892, he
published an important textbook on Thermodynamics [64] based on the lectures
he had read at the Sorbonne several years before. A Poincare´ publication would of
course not go unnoticed, and one attentive reader had been the British physicist
Peter Guthrie Tait (1831-1901). Tait had been very close to Maxwell and was one of
the most enthusiastic followers of his work. He wrote a review of Poincare´’s book for
the journal Nature ([87]); the review was quite negative despite the obvious talent
Tait recognized in his young French colleague.
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Poincare´, wrote Tait, introduced beautiful and complex mathematical theories in
his textbook but often to the detriment of the physical meaning of the situations
he studied. The most important reproach of the British physicist was the fact that
Poincare´ remained absolutely silent about the statistical theories of thermodynam-
ics, leaving in the shadows the works of Tait’s friend and master Maxwell. Tait
wrote:
‘But the most unsatisfactory part of the whole work is, it seems to us,
the entire ignoration of the true (i.e. the statistical) basis of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. According to Clerk-Maxwell (Nature, xvii. 278)
“The touch-stone of a treatise on Thermodynamics is what is called the
Second Law.” We need not quote the very clear statement which follows
this, as it is probably accessible to all our readers. It certainly has not
much resemblance to what will be found on the point in M. Poincare´’s
work: so little, indeed, that if we were to judge by these two writings alone
it would appear that, with the exception of the portion treated in the
recent investigations of v. Helmholtz, the science had been retrograding,
certainly not advancing, for the last twenty years.’
Poincare´ wrote an answer and sent it to Nature on 24 February 1892. It was
followed, during the first semester of 1892, by six other letters between Tait and
Poincare´1; they are rather sharp, each sticking to his position. On March 17th,
Poincare´ wrote the following comment about the major criticism made by Tait:
‘I left completely aside a mechanical explanation of the principle of Clau-
sius that M. Tait calls “the true (i.e. statistical) basis of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.” I did not speak about this explanation, which besides
seems to me rather unsatisfactory, because I desired to remain absolutely
outside all the molecular hypotheses, as ingenious they may be; and in
particular I said nothing about the kinetic theory of gases.’2
One thus observes that Poincare´, in 1892, had a very negative view of statistical
mechanics, the very science of matter in which probabilities played the greatest
role. However, Poincare´ would not have been Poincare´ if, once shown a difficulty, he
did not take the bull by the horns and to try to tame it. A first decision was the
resolution, during the next academic year, 1893, to lecture on the kinetic theory of
gases. And indeed, in the Sorbonne syllabus for that year, we see that Poincare´ had
transformed his lectures into Thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of gases.
In 1894 Poincare´’s first published paper on the kinetic theory of gases [67], to
which we shall return later. If one still observes a good deal of skepticism in it, or
at least reservation about these novelties in randomness, a change of attitude was
taking place. This same academic year 1893-1894, Poincare´ eventually decided for
the first time to teach a course on the calculus of probability at the Sorbonne, which
subsequently became the basis of his book of 1896, the same year when he exchanged
1Accessible freely on the website of the Archives Poincare´ in Nancy at the address http://www.univ-
nancy2.fr/poincare/chp/hpcoalpha.xml
2‘J’ai laisse´ comple`tement de coˆte´ une explication me´canique du principe de Clausius que M. Tait appelle “the
true (i.e. statistical) basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.” Je n’ai pas parle´ de cette explication, qui me
paraˆıt d’ailleurs assez peu satisfaisante, parce que je de´sirais rester comple`tement en dehors de toutes les hypothe`ses
mole´culaires quelque inge´nieuses qu’elles puissent eˆtre; et en particulier j’ai passe´ sous silence la the´orie cine´tique
des gaz’.
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his chair for that of celestial mechanics. Moreover, in the following years, reflections
on the mathematics of randomness became more frequent in his writings, up to the
publication of his more philosophical works, which acknowledged the integration of
the theory of probability among Poincare´’s mathematical tools. By 1906, as already
noted, the transition had been completed, especially as new elements, such as Ein-
stein’s just published theory of Brownian motion, made even more necessary the
increasing presence of probability in scientific theories.
The present paper concerns the probabilistic aspects of Poincare´’s enormous pro-
duction, aspects of which remain somewhat limited in size. A non-negligible chal-
lenge in dealing with this subject is that probability penetrated Poincare´’s work
almost by force, forcing his hand several times, his main achievement consisting in
building dykes so that the mathematician might venture with a dry foot on these
rather soft lands. We shall see later that his successor Borel had a somewhat different
attitude toward choosing to apply probability theory in many domains, reflecting
the fact that Borel had encountered probability in a more spectacular way than
Poincare´.
Despite this limited contribution, Poincare´ succeeded in leaving a significant her-
itage which would later prove important. Above all, his most decisive influence may
have been to allow probability theory to regain its prestige in France again, after
occupying a rather miserable position in the French academic world for more than
half a century.
The aim of the present paper is therefore threefold, and this is reflected in its
three parts. In the first part, we focus on Poincare´’s evolution in the fifteen years
we have just pointed to, in order to define how this progressive taming of the math-
ematics of randomness occurred. In the second section, I examine in detail several
of Poincare´’s works involving probability considerations in order to give an idea not
only of Poincare´’s style, but also of the intellectual basis for the evolution in his
thinking. And finally, in the last section, I comment on the persons who recovered
the heritage of Poincare´ in this area, and on how they extended it.
Many of the topics discussed in this paper have been covered previously. In par-
ticular, I shall refer several times to Sheynin’s text ([84]), to von Plato’s publica-
tions ([90], [91]) as well as to several papers by Bru, some published and some not
([20], [23]). Let us me also mention the nice book [36] where the author deals with
Poincare´’s works on probability with an epistemological approach.
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1 First part: the discovery of probability
In the beginning was the Chair. For, as we will see, it was not only by a fortu-
itous scientific interest that Poincare´ first came to be involved in probability theory,
but there was also a very specific academic situation in which Hermite, the major
mathematical authority in 1880s France, crusaded for the career of his three mathe-
matical stars: Paul Appell (his nephew), E´mile Picard (his son-in-law) and of course
Henri Poincare´, the latter considered by him to be the most brilliant, though he did
not belong to his family (to the great displeasure, so he wrote to Mittag-Leﬄer, of
Madame Hermite). A remarkable change took place at the Sorbonne at this time
when, in just a few years, almost every holder of the existing chairs in mathemat-
ics and physics died: Liouville and Briot in 1882, Puiseux in 1883, Bouquet and
Desains in 1885, Jamin in 1886, leaving an open field for a spectacular change in
the professorships. At the end of the whirlwind, the average age of the professors of
mathematics and physics at the Sorbonne had been reduced by eighteen years! It
was therefore clear for everyone, and first of all Hermite, that there was a risk that
the situation might become fixed for a long time, and that it was therefore necessary
to act swiftly and resolutely in favor of his prote´ge´s. The three of them were, indeed,
appointed in Paris during these years. This episode is narrated in detail in [2] and I
here touch only upon the most important aspects insofar as they relate to our story.
The Chair of Calculus of Probability and Mathematical Physics, occupied until
1882 by Briot, had been created some thirty years before, after numerous unsuc-
cessful attempts by Poisson, but in a form different than the one pursued by the
latter. The joining of mathematical physics to probability had been decided in order
to temper the bad reputation of the theory of probability in the 1840s in France,
notably due to some of the work of Laplace and, above all, of Poisson himself deal-
ing with the application of probability in the judicial domain. The book of Poisson
[79] ignited a dispute in the Academy in 1836, when Dupin and Poinsot harshly
contested Poisson’s conclusions, and the philosophers led by Victor Cousin made a
scene in the name of the sacred rights of liberty against the claims advanced by the
mathematicians in order to explain how events occur in social issues. John Stuart
Mill summed up the situation by qualifying the application of probability to judi-
cial problems as the scandal of mathematics. This polemical contretemps tarred the
calculus of probability in France, leaving it with a most dubious reputation.
Although Lippmann was nominated in 1885 for the chair, Jamin’s unexpected
demise freed the chair of Research in physics of which Lippmann took hold immedi-
ately, leaving a place for Poincare´. One might initially be surprised by this choice.
First, because Poincare´ was preferred to other candidates, of course less gifted, but
whose area of research was closer to that of the position. One would rather have
expected to see Poincare´ in one of the chairs in Analysis, for instance. In 1882, when
Briot died and the great game began, Poincare´ had no published work in physics
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(let alone the calculus of probability). And yet, among the candidates who were
eliminated, there was for instance Boussinesq who had to his credit significant con-
tributions in that domain, and who openly stated his intention of revitalizing the
teaching of probability which seemed to him to be in a poor state. Not without
irony, Boussinesq later became Poincare´’s successor in this same chair when the
latter changed over to the Chair of Celestial Mechanics.
Thus Poincare´ was nominated in 1886, without any real title for the position, and
one may think that it had really been chance which led him there. However, as shown
in Atten’s fine analysis [2], a number of indications demonstrate that Poincare´ had
indeed really desired this particular position. Examining his lectures in 1887-1888
shows that he already had a profound knowledge of physical theories and, moreover,
several passages in his correspondence at this time show his sustained interest in
questions of physics. This shows that his attitude had not been purely opportunistic
and that the chair pleased him. Also, Hermite, apart from the desire of supporting his
prote´ge´, seems to have made a thoughtful bet in nominating him for this somewhat
unexpected position. Knowing Poincare´’s acute mind, it was not unreasonable to
anticipate spectacular achievements by him in this position. What followed, as we
know, bore out Hermite’s expectation. . .
The theory of probability, as I said, did not seem to concern the new professor
at the beginning of his tenure, and he taught courses on several different physical
theories. In 1892, he published his lectures on thermodynamics, delivered in 1888-
1889 [64], producing a book, as noted earlier, that was sharply criticized by Tait.
Poincare´ therefore decided to look into the questions raised by the kinetic theory
of gases, in particular because he had just read a communication by Lord Kelvin
to the Royal Society containing several fundamental criticisms on Maxwell’s theory
[47]. Perhaps Poincare´ had been especially eager to read this paper because it might
provide a powerful argument in his controversy with Tait. However, the affair took
another direction, revealing the mathematician’s profound scientific honesty. At the
beginning of the paper [67], published in 1894, though he again expressed some
skepticism, Poincare´, whose conventionalism was formed during these years, seemed
already half convinced of the possible fecundity of Maxwell’s theory.
‘Does this theory deserve the efforts the English devoted to it? One may
sometimes ask the question; I doubt that, right now, it may explain all
the facts we know. But the question is not to know if it is true; this word
does not have any meaning when this kind of theory is concerned. The
question is to know whether its fecundity is exhausted or if it can still
help to make discoveries. And admittedly we cannot forget that it was
useful to M. Crookes in his research on radiant matter and also to the
inventors of the osmotic pressure. One can therefore still make use of the
kinetic hypothesis, as long as one is not fooled by it.’3
We shall come back in the second section to this article of 1894 and to the new
formulation of the ergodic principle it contains, in which Poincare´ introduced the
3‘Cette the´orie me´rite-t-elle les efforts que les Anglais y ont consacre´s ? On peut quelquefois se le demander; je
doute que, de`s a` pre´sent, elle puisse rendre compte de tous les faits connus. Mais il ne s’agit pas de savoir si elle est
vraie; ce mot en ce qui concerne une the´orie de ce genre n’a aucun sens. Il s’agit de savoir si sa fe´condite´ est e´puise´e
ou si elle peut encore aider a` faire des de´couvertes. Or, on ne saurait oublier qu’elle a e´te´ utile a` M. Crookes dans
ses travaux sur la matie`re radiante ainsi qu’aux inventeurs de la pression osmotique. On peut donc encore se servir
de l’hypothe`se cine´tique, pourvu qu’on n’en soit pas dupe.’ ([67], p.513)
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restriction of exceptional initial states. Let us only mention here the following point:
Poincare´ seemed to have found this idea in his previous work on the three body
problem for which he had obtained the prize of the King of Sweden in 1889. In
the memoir presented for the prize, he had indeed proved a recurrence theorem
concerning the existence of trajectories such that the system comes back an infinite
number of times in any region of the space, no matter how small. The next year,
for his paper in Acta Mathematica, Poincare´ added a probabilistic extension of his
theorem where he showed that the set of initial conditions for which the trajectories
come back only a finite number of times in the selected region has probability zero
([62], p.71-72); this passage was included some years later in his treatise of new
methods for celestial mechanics [65] in a section simply called ‘Probabilities’.
During the academic year 1893-1894, Poincare´ prepared his first course of probabil-
ity for his students of mathematical physics ([69]), published in 1896 and transcribed
by Albert Quiquet, a former student of the E´cole Normale Supe´rieure who entered
the institution in 1883, before becoming an actuary, and who had probably been an
attentive listener of the master’s voice. In the manner of the standard probability
textbooks of the time, it does not present a unified theoretical body but rather a
series of questions that Poincare´ tried to answer (the main ones, which occupy the
bulk of the volume, concern the theory of errors of measurement - a subject we shall
return to in the next section). The book, in its edition of 1896, is a natural successor
to Bertrand’s textbook [9], which up to then was the standard textbook (see [21]).
In comparison to Bertrand’s book, Poincare´’s consolidates the material in several
interesting ways, and this aspect is even more obvious in the second edition [77],
completed by Poincare´ some months before his death in July, 1912.
The mathematician seemed now convinced that it was no longer possible to get
rid of probability altogether in science, so he decided instead to make the theory
as acceptable as possible to the scientist. Poincare´ decided to devote considerable
effort towards that end, especially by writing several texts lying half-way between
popularization (with the meaning of writing a description of several modern con-
cepts using as little technical jargon as possible) and innovation. Two texts are of
particular importance: that of 1899 ([70]) - reprinted as a chapter of [71] - and
that of 1907 ([75]) - reprinted again as [76] and then as a preface to the second
edition of his textbook [77] - two texts marking Poincare´’s desire to show off his
new probabilistic credo. But one has to realize that Poincare´ wanted to convince
himself above all and this leads one to ask the question Jean-Paul Pier ironically
used as the title for his paper [61]: did Poincare´ believe in the calculus of probability
or not? Without pretending to give a final answer, one may however observe that
Poincare´ very honestly sought for a demarcation of the zone where it seemed to him
that using probability theory did not create a major problem. Hence the attempt to
tackle some fundamental questions in order to go beyond the defects that Bertrand
had ironically illustrated with his famous paradoxes: When is it legitimate to let
randomness intervene? What definition can be given of probability? Which mathe-
matical techniques can be developed in order to obtain useful tools for physics, in
particular for the kinetic theory of gases? Borel, as we shall see in the third section,
would later remember Poincare´’s position.
In his 1907 text, Poincare´ accurately defined the legitimate way to call upon the
notion of randomness. He saw essentially three origins for randomness: the ignorance
of a very small cause that we cannot know but which produces a very important
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effect (such as the so-called Butterfly Effect), the complexity of the causes which
prevents us from giving any explanation other than a statistical one (as in the kinetic
theory of gases), the intervention of an unexpected cause that we have neglected.
This was not too far from the Laplacian conception, which should not surprise us
very much since Poincare´, born in 1854, was a child of a century for which Laplace
was a tutelary figure. However, Poincare´ knew well the accusations accumulated
against Laplace’s theory and he proposed several ways to adjust it: randomness,
even if it is connected to our ignorance to a certain extent, is not only that, and it is
important to define the nature of the connection between randomness and ignorance.
The conventionalist posture on which we have already commented naturally made
things easier, but Poincare´ did not seek facility. As he wrote in 1899:
‘How shall we know that two possible cases are equally probable? Will
it be by virtue of a convention? If we state an explicit convention at the
beginning of each problem, everything will be fine; we will just apply the
rules of arithmetic and algebra, and pursue the computation to the end,
such that our result leaves no room for doubt. But, if we want to apply it
anywhere, we will have to prove the legitimacy of our convention, and we
will find ourselves in front of the difficulty we thought we had eluded.’4
In a remarkable creative achievement, Poincare´ forged a method allowing the ob-
jectification of some probabilities. Using it, if one considers for instance a casino
roulette with alternate black and red sectors, even without having the slightest idea
of how it is put into motion, one may show it is reasonable to suppose that after a
large number of turns, the probability that the ball stops in a red zone (or a black
zone) is equal to 1/2. There are thus situations where one can go beyond the hazy
Laplacian principle of (in)sufficient reason as a necessary convention to fix the value
of the probability. The profound method of arbitrary functions, which is based on
the hypothesis that at the initial time the distribution of the position where the ball
stops is arbitrary and shows that this distribution reaches an asymptotic equilibrium
and tends towards the uniform distribution, was certainly Poincare´’s most impor-
tant invention in the domain of probability and we shall see later the spectacular
course it took.
To conclude this survey, let us mention that in 1906, when Poincare´ was com-
pleting his report for the Cour de Cassation in the Dreyfus case, despite his place
as the pre-eminent French authority in the theory of probability, he was, as far as
his scientific thought was concerned, somewhat in the middle of the ford between a
completely deterministic description of the world and our modern conceptions where
randomness enters as a fundamental ingredient. Poincare´ kept this uncomfortable
position until the end of his life. It is besides noticeable that at the precise moment
when Borel was - so strikingly - taking over, Poincare´ did not seem to have been
particularly interested in the enterprise of his young follower. He showed similarly
disinterest for the fortunate experiments of the unfortunate Bachelier: he had writ-
ten, it is true, a benevolent report on his thesis [3] and had sometimes helped him
to obtain grants, but the two men had no further scientific contact [29]. Even more
4‘Comment saurons nous que deux cas possibles sont e´galement probables? Sera-ce par une convention? Si nous
plac¸ons au de´but de chaque proble`me une convention explicite, tout ira bien; nous n’aurons plus qu’a` appliquer les
re`gles de l’arithme´tique et de l’alge`bre et nous irons jusqu’au bout du calcul sans que notre re´sultat puisse laisser
place au doute. Mais, si nous voulons en faire la moindre application, il faudra de´montrer que notre convention e´tait
le´gitime, et nous nous retrouverons en face de la difficulte´ que nous avions cru e´luder.’ ([70], p.262)
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suprising, Poincare´ seems to have thoroughly ignored the Russian school’s works
(Chebyshev, Markov, Lyapounov. . . ) and this explains why he became never con-
scious of some connections with his own works. Poincare´’s probabilistic studies leave
therefore a feeling of incompleteness, partly due probably to his premature death
at the age of 58, but also to the singular situation of this last giant of Newtonian-
Laplacian science who remained on the threshold of upheavals that arrived after his
death.
2 Second part: construction of a probabilistic approach
In this second part, I would like to present some steps which have marked the
progressive entry of questions on probability in Poincare´’s works. Even if it is not
possible to see a perfect continuity in the chain of his research, a kind of genealogy
can be traced which allows one to better understand how the mathematician grad-
ually adopted a probabilistic point of view in several situations. I feel a need to
mention that my aim in this section is to describe Poincare´’s contribution and not
necessarily to comment its originality. A particular problem with our hero is that
he practically never quotes his sources so that it is difficult to make a statement
about what he had read or not. I have tried as much as was possible to make each
subsection of this part independent of the others, which may sometimes result in
brief repetition.
2.1 The recurrence theorem and its ‘probabilistic’ extension
In anticipation of the sixtieth birthday of King Oscar II of Sweden in 1889, a math-
ematical competition was organized by Mittag-Leﬄer. The subject concerned the
three-body problem: Was the system Earth-Moon-Sun stable? Periodic? Organized
so that it will always remain in a finite zone of space? Many of these questions
were fundamental ones that had challenged Newtonian mechanics from the 18th
century. Poincare´ submitted in 1888 an impressive memoir, immediately selected
for the award by a jury including Weierstrass, Mittag-Leﬄer and Hermite. While
correcting the proofs of the paper for Acta Mathematica, Phragmen located a mis-
take, leading Poincare´ to make numerous amendments before resubmitting a lengthy
paper the following year, published in volume 13 of Acta Mathematica.
This story, well known and well documented (see in particular [7]), is of interest
for us only as far as one difference between the version submitted for the prize and
the published version in 1890 is the appearance of the word probability, certainly
for the first time in the French mathematician’s works. I shall closely follow Bru’s
investigation [23] on the way in which countable operations gradually established
themselves in the mathematics of randomness.
In the first part of the memoir submitted for the competition, Poincare´ studied
the implications of the existence of integral invariants on the behavior of dynamical
systems. A simple example of this situation is given by the case of an incompressible
flow for which the shape of the set of molecules changes, but not its volume, which
remains constant in time. However, Poincare´ had in view a much more general
situation. He showed in fact on p.46 and seq. of [62] that with a proper choice of
coordinates in the phase space of position and velocity, the general situation of a
mechanical system may be expressed by such an integral invariant. Poincare´ then
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expounded a version of his recurrence theorem in the following form: let E be a
bounded portion of the space, composed of mobile points following the equations
of mechanics, so that the total volume remains invariant in time. Let us suppose,
writes Poincare´, that the mobile points remain always in E. Then, if one considers
r0 a region of E, no matter however small it may be, there will be some trajectories
which will enter it an infinite number of times.
Poincare´’s proof is a model of ingenuity and simplicity. One discretizes time with
a step of amplitude τ . Let us call with Poincare´
r1, r2, . . . , rn, . . .
the “consequents” of r0, that is to say, the successive positions of the different points
of the region r0 at times
τ, 2τ, . . . , nτ, . . .
In the same way, the “antecedent” of a region is the region of which it is the imme-
diate consequent. Each region ri has the same volume; as they remain by hypothesis
inside a bounded zone, some of them necessarily intersect. Let two such regions be
rp and rq with p < q, with intersection the region s1 having nonzero volume: a point
starting in s1 will be back in s1 at time (q−p)τ . Going back in time, let us call r10 the
sub-region of r0 whose p-th consequent is s1. A particle starting from r
1
0 will again
enter this region at time (q − p)τ . We now start again the process by replacing r0
by r10, and thus build a decreasing sequence (r
n
0 ) of sub-regions of r0 such that each
point starting from rn0 returns n times at least. Considering a point in the intersec-
tion of the rn0 (whose non-emptiness is taken for granted by Poincare´), a trajectory
starting from such a point will pass an infinite number of times through r0.
In this form, the theorem is therefore completely deterministic. What then com-
pelled Poincare´ to believe it necessary, in the new version published in 1890, to
rewrite his result in a probabilistic setting ([62], pp.71-72)? At first glance indeed,
the appearance of the word probability in these pages may seem surprising in the
chosen framework of the mechanics of Newton, Laplace and Hamilton. In fact, as
Bru remarks ([23]), one must not be misled by this use of probability by Poincare´,
viewing it as a sudden revelation of the presence of randomness having the ontic
value we spontaneously give it today. Poincare´ himself wrote: je me propose main-
tenant d’expliquer pourquoi [les trajectoires non re´currentes] peuvent eˆtre regarde´es
comme exceptionnelles. What Poincare´ was thus looking for was a convenient way
of expressing the rarity, the thinness of a set. He was writing before the decisive cre-
ation of the measure theoretic tools and particularly of Borel’s thesis which would,
four years later, prove that a countable set has a measure equal to zero. For a long
while, astronomers in particular employed the concept of probability with the mean-
ing of practical rarity and certainly one should not seek for a more sophisticated
explanation to justify the presence of the word coming from Poincare´’s pen. It was
a convenient way of speaking, whose aim was almost entirely to hide the obscure
instinct mentioned by Poincare´ in his 1899 paper ([70], p.262), almost as an apology,
because we cannot do without it if we want to do scientific work.
Poincare´ begins by expounding the following ‘definition’: if one calls p0 the prob-
ability that the considered mobile point starts from a region r0 with volume v0 and
p′0 the probability that it starts from another region r
′
0 with volume v
′
0, then
p0
p′0
=
v0
v′0
.
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In particular, if r0 is a region with volume v, used as a reference, the probability
that the mobile point starting from r0 starts from a sub-region σ0 with volume w
is given by
w
rv
. Equipped with this notion, the mathematician wants to prove that
the initial conditions in r0 such that the trajectory does not reenter r0 more than k
times form a set with probability zero, no matter how large the integer k.
Earlier in his paper, Poincare´ had proved that if r0, . . . , rn−1 were n regions with
the same volume v included in a common region with volume V , and if nv > kV ,
then it was necessary that there were at least k + 1 regions whose intersection was
nonempty. Indeed, if one supposes that all the intersections taken k + 1 by k + 1
were empty, one may write (in modern notation) that
n−1∑
i=0
1Iri ≤ k, hence nv ≤ kV
by integrating over the volume V .
Let us still suppose valid the hypothesis of the previous theorem which asserts
that the mobile point remains in a bounded region, in a portion of the space with
volume V , and let us again take the discrete step τ in time. Let us next choose
n sufficiently large so that n >
kV
v
. One may then find, among the n successive
consequents of a region r0 with volume v, k + 1 consequents, denoted
rα0 , rα1 , . . . , rαk
with α1 < α2 < · · · < αk, having a nonempty intersection denoted by sαk . Let us
now call s0 the αk-th antecedent of sαk and sp, the p-th consequent of s0. If a mobile
point starts from s0, it will enter the regions
s0, sαk−αk−1 , sαk−αk−2 , . . . , sαk−α2 , sαk−α1 , sαk−α0
which, by construction, are all included in r0 (as for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, the αi-th
consequent of sαk−αi is in sαk and therefore in rαi) . One has therefore shown that
there are, in the considered region r0, initial conditions of trajectories which pass at
least k + 1 times through r0.
Let us eventually fix a region r0 with volume v. Let us consider, writes Poincare´,
σ0 the subset of r0 such that the trajectories issued from σ0 do not pass through r0
at least k + 1 times between time 0 and time (n − 1)τ ; denote by w the volume of
σ0. The probability pk of the set of such trajectories is therefore
w
v
.
By hypothesis a trajectory starting from σ0 does not pass k + 1 times through
r0 , and hence not through σ0. From the previous result, one has necessarily that
nw < kV , such that
pk <
kV
nv
.
No matter how large k may be, one may choose n large so that this probability can
be made as small as wanted. Poincare´, tacitly using the continuity of probability
along a non-increasing sequence of events, concludes that the probability of the
trajectories issued from r0 which do not pass through r0 more than k times between
times 0 and ∞ is zero.
2.2 Kinetic theory of gases
As observed in the introduction, in 1892 Poincare´ was not favorably disposed to-
wards the statistical description of thermodynamics. His polemics with Tait, from
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which I quoted several passages, was closely tied to the mechanist spirit in which
Poincare´ had been educated. Statistical mechanics, and in particular the kinetic
theory of gases, could not therefore pretend to be more than an ingenious construc-
tion with no explanatory value. An important text revealing Poincare´’s thoughts
on the subject was published immediately afterwards, in 1893, in one of the first
issues of the Revue de Me´taphysique et de Morale [66]. With great honesty, Poincare´
mentioned the classical mechanical conception of the universe due to Newton and
Laplace, but also the numerous problems it encounters when it tries to explain
numerous practical situations of irreversibility, as in the case of molecular motion
in thermodynamics. Poincare´ mentioned that the kinetic theory of gases proposed
by the English is the attempt la plus se´rieuse de conciliation entre le me´canisme
et l’expe´rience ([66], p.536). Nevertheless, he stated that numerous difficulties still
remained, in particular for reconciling the recurrence of mechanical systems (“un
the´ore`me facile a` e´tablir”, wrote the author, who may have adopted a humouristic
posture) with the experimental observation of convergence towards a stable state.
The manner in which the kinetic theory of gases pretends to evacuate the problem,
by invoking that what is called a stable equilibrium is in fact a transitory state in
which the system remains an enormous time, did not seem to convince our hero.
However, at least, the tone adopted in [66] is obviously calmer than that of the
exchanges with Tait. Another point which can be observed is that here, as in other
works by Poincare´ we shall comment on, Boltzmann was nowhere to be found. This
absence, difficult to imagine as involuntary, remains unexplained, including for Von
Plato in [90], p.84.
In 1892, Lord Kelvin presented a note [47] to the Royal Society (of which he
was then the president) with an unambiguous title. The note presented an ad hoc
example demonstrating, in a supposedly decisive way, the failure of equipartition
of kinetic energy following Maxwell and Boltzmann’s theory. The two physicists
had indeed deduced the equipartition of kinetic energy as a basic principle of their
theory: the average kinetic energies of several independent parts of a system are in
the same ratio as the ratio of the number of degrees of freedom they have. This
result was fundamental for the establishment of a relation between kinetic energy
and temperature.
In his short paper, Kelvin imagined a mechanical system including three points
A,B,C, which are in motion in this order on a line KL, such that B remains almost
motionless and only reacts to the shocks produced by A and C on one side and
the other, whereas the mechanical situation on both sides is different because of a
repulsive force F acting on A and pushing it towards B (in the zone KH of the
scheme) while C can move freely.
The total energy of C is balanced by the energy of A, but, as the latter includes a
non-negative potential-energy term due to the repulsive force, Kelvin triumphantly
concluded that the average kinetic energy of A and C cannot be equal, as they
should have been following Maxwell’s theory as the two points each have one degree
of freedom. Kelvin commented:
‘It is in truth only for an approximately “perfect” gas, that is to say, an
assemblage of molecules in which each molecule moves for comparatively
long times in lines very approximately straight, and experiences changes of
velocity and direction in comparatively very short times of collision, and
it is only for the kinetic energy of the translatory motions of the molecules
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Figure 1: Kelvin’s construction in [47].
of the “perfect gas” that the temperature is equal to the average kinetic
energy per molecule.’ ([47], p.399)
Reading this note encouraged Poincare´, as he noted, to reflect on the kinetic theory
of gases, to understand whether Kelvin’s objection was well-founded, and to draw
his own conclusions on the subject. At this precise moment, when he had been
attacked by Tait, the title of the note by such an authority as Kelvin had impressed
him and he may have thought he would find there a decisive argument confirming
his own skepticism. And so in 1894 Poincare´ published his first paper on the kinetic
theory of gases [67]. Poincare´ began by presenting a long general exposition of the
fundamentals of Maxwell’s theory. This survey seemed necessary in the first place
because the kinetic theory of gases had been much less studied by French physicists
than by English physicists5. These fundamentals were in the first place the ergodic
principle, called the postulate of Maxwell by Poincare´, which asserts that, whatever
may be the initial situation of the system, it will always pass an infinity of times as
close as desired to any position compatible with the integrals of the motion; from
this postulate Maxwell drew a theorem whose main consequence was precisely the
point contested by Kelvin: in a system for which the only integral is the conservation
of the kinetic energy, if the system is made up of two independent parts, the long
run mean values of the kinetic energy of these two parts are in the same ratio as
their numbers of degrees of freedom.
Poincare´ began by observing, as previously in [66], that the recurrence theorem of
[62] contradicted Maxwell’s postulate along the recurrent solutions. It was therefore
5‘[. . . ] a e´te´ beaucoup moins cultive´e par les physiciens franc¸ais que par les anglais.’ ([67], p.513)
1012 L. Mazliak Se´minaire Poincare´
necessary at least to add that the postulate was true except for certain initial con-
ditions. 6 As von Plato comments [90] (p.84), we have here the formulation usually
given today for the ergodic principle, in order to take into account the possibility
of exceptional initial conditions. Once again, although this idea was also present in
Boltzmann’s works, the Austrian scientist was nowhere mentioned.
But it was above all the objection contained in Kelvin’s paper that Poincare´ desired
to analyze in detail in order to check whether it contradicted Maxwell’s results or
not. From the situation of the system A, C, Poincare´ built a representative geometric
model: a point M in a phase space with three dimensions whose first coordinate is
the speed of A, the second the speed of C and the third the abscissa of A. Using
Kelvin’s system conditions, he could define S, a solid of revolution, from which M
cannot exit in the course of time. Naturally, two small regions included in S with the
same volume can be entered a different number of times with the same total sojourn
time because the speed in these volumes could be different. Poincare´ introduced the
notion of the density of the trajectory in a small element in S with volume v as the
quotient
t
v
, where t is the total time spent by the trajectory in v ([67], p.519). Using
this representation, Poincare´ could define the average value of the kinetic energy for
A as the moment of inertia of S with respect to the plane yz, for C as the moment
of inertia with respect to xz, the ‘masses’ in S being distributed by the previously
defined density. The solid S being one of revolution, these moments of inertia are
equal: the fine analysis made by Poincare´ therefore shows that one can recover the
equipartition result by taking the average of the kinetic energies not uniformly over
time but taking into account the phases of the motion and their duration.
Poincare´ concluded his paper with a comment that may seem paradoxical in light
of the result he had just obtained. While disputing the decisive character of Kelvin’s
arguments, Poincare´ insisted that he nevertheless shared his colleague’s skepticism.
To give weight to his comment, he slightly transformed Kelvin’s example in order to
produce an ad hoc situation for which there really is a problem. In fact, some lines
earlier, Poincare´ had emphasized what was for him the fundamental point:
‘I believe Maxwell’s theorem really is a necessary consequence of his postu-
late, as soon as one admits the existence of a mean state; but the postulate
itself must admit many exceptions.’7
For Poincare´, it was therefore the definition of the average states that posed a
problem, and it was the search for a satisfactory definition that required attention
from those those who wished to consolidate the bases of statistical mechanics. We
shall see later that it was indeed in this direction that Poincare´, and later Borel,
focussed their efforts.
2.3 Limit theorems
The textbook [69] published in 1896 constitutes the first of Poincare´’s works dealing
explicitly with the theory of probabilities. It was, as already mentioned, the result
of lectures offered by Poincare´ during the academic year 1893-94 at the Sorbonne,
6‘[. . . ] sauf pour certaines conditions initiales exceptionnelles’ ([67], p.518)
7‘Je crois que le the´ore`me de Maxwell est bien une conse´quence ne´cessaire de son postulat, du moment qu’on
admet l’existence d’un e´tat moyen; mais le postulat lui-meˆme doit comporter de nombreuses exceptions.’ ([67],
p.521)
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redacted by a former student of the E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, who became an
actuary and who probably wished to learn with the master; it was published by
Georges Carre´. This first edition does not have a preface, and presents itself as a
succession of 22 lectures, more or less connected to each other, probably reflecting
Poincare´’s actual lectures. It is 274 pages long, compared to the 341 pages of the
second edition of 1912 [77], which provides an idea of the number of complements.
In its initial form, Poincare´’s book appears as a successor to Bertrand’s treatise
[9], the framework of which it follows. Nevertheless, these textbooks really have a
different feel, and we must leave it at that for the moment. However, as Poincare´’s
textbook has been discussed by several commetators, especially in [84] and [25],
I shall restrict myself to just a few remarks. Let us note that the authors just
mentioned focused on the 1912 edition, which naturally benefited from reflections of
Poincare´ after that very important period of the mid-1890s, when he was beginning
to investigate the mathematics of randomness, so that this may not accurately reflect
the mathematician’s state of mind in 1896. I choose here, in contrast, to focus on
the original 1896 version.
An important part of Poincare´’s textbook is devoted to the use of probability the-
ory as a model of measurement error in the experimental sciences. In a commentary
on his own works ([78], p.121), Poincare´ wrote:
‘The Mathematical Physics Chair has for its official title: Calculus of Prob-
ability and Mathematical Physics. This connection can be justified by the
applications of this calculus in all physics experiments, or by those in ki-
netic gas theory. In any case, for one semester I dealt with probability and
my lectures were published. The theory of errors was naturally my main
goal. I had to erect explicit reservations concerning the generality of the
‘law of errors’, but I sought to justify the law via new considerations in
the cases where it remains legitimate.’8
In [69], the analysis of the law of errors begins on page 147 and occupies part of
the following chapters. Poincare´ commented on the manner in which the Gaussian
character of the error had been obtained:
‘[This distribution] cannot be obtained by rigorous deductions. Several of
its putative proofs are awful, including, among others, the one based on the
statement that gap probability is proportional to the gaps. Nonetheless,
everyone believes it, as M. Lippmann told me one day, because experi-
menters imagine it to be a mathematical theorem, while mathematicians
imagine it to be an experimental fact.’9
Much of Poincare´’s treatment of the law of errors, in particular the convergence to
a Gaussian distribution of a Bayesian approach of the measurement process, was in
8‘La Chaire de Physique Mathe´matique a pour titre officiel : Calcul des Probabilite´s et Physique Mathe´matique.
Ce rattachement peut se justifier par les applications que peut avoir ce calcul dans toutes les expe´riences de Physique;
ou par celles qu’il a trouve´es dans la the´orie cine´tique des gaz. Quoi qu’il en soit, je me suis occupe´ des probabilite´s
pendant un semestre et mes lec¸ons ont e´te´ publie´es. La the´orie des erreurs e´tait naturellement mon principal but.
J’ai duˆ faire d’expresses re´serves sur la ge´ne´ralite´ de la “loi des erreurs”; mais j’ai cherche´ a` la justifier, dans les cas
ou` elle reste le´gitime, par des conside´rations nouvelles.’
9‘[Cette loi] ne s’obtient pas par des de´ductions rigoureuses; plus d’une de´monstration qu’on a voulu en donner
est grossie`re, entre autres celle qui s’appuie sur l’affirmation que la probabilite´ des e´carts est proportionnelle aux
e´carts. Tout le monde y croit cependant, me disait un jour M. Lippmann, car les expe´rimentateurs s’imaginent que
c’est un the´ore`me de mathe´matiques, et les mathe´maticiens que c’est un fait expe´rimental.’([69], p.149)
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fact already found by Laplace, at least in a preliminary form. Once again, it is not
really possible to make precise what Poincare´ knew. For details on what is today
known as the Bernstein-von Mises theorem see [88] (p.140 et seq. and its references).
Let us consider observations of a phenomenon denoted by x1, x2, . . . , xn. The true
measure of the phenomenon under study being z, the a priori probability that each
of these n observations belong to the interval [xi, xi + dxi] is taken under the form
ϕ(x1, z)ϕ(x2, z) . . . ϕ(xn, z)dx1dx2 . . . dxn.
Let finally ψ(z)dz be the a priori probability so that the true value belongs to the
interval [z, z + dz[.
Supposing that ψ is constant and that ϕ(xi, z) can be written under the form
ϕ(z − xi), Gauss obtained the Gaussian distribution by looking for the ϕ such that
the most probable value was the empirical mean
x =
x1 + · · ·+ xn
n
.
Poincare´ recalled ([69], p.152) Bertrand’s objections to Gauss’ result; Bertrand had
in particular disputed the requirement that the mean be the most probable value
while the natural condition would have been to require it to be the probable value
(which is to say the expectation).
Poincare´ thus considered the possibility of suppressing some of Gauss’ conditions.
Keeping firstly the hypothesis that the empirical mean be the most probable value
([69], p.155 - see also the details in [84], p.149 et seq.), he obtained for the form of
the error function
ϕ(x1, z) = θ(x1)e
A(z)x1+B(z),
where θ and A are two arbitrary functions, B being such that the following differ-
ential equation is satisfied: A′(z)z +B′(z) = 0.
Considering next Bertrand’s objection, Poincare´ looked next at the problem that
arises when one replaces the requirement of the most probable value with that of the
probable value. Here ([69], p.158) he gives a theorem he would use subsequently a
number of times: if ϕ1 and ϕ2 are two continuous functions, the quotient∫
ϕ1(z)Φ
p(z)dz∫
ϕ2(z)Φp(z)dz
tends, when p→ +∞, towards
ϕ1(z0)
ϕ2(z0)
,
where z0 is a point in which Φ attains its unique maximum. Following his habit,
which drove Mittag-Leﬄer to dispair, Poincare´’s writing was somewhat laconic; he
did not specify any precise hypothesis, or supply a real proof, presenting the result
only as an extrapolation of the discrete case.
In any case, considering next
Φ(x1, . . . , xn; z) = ϕ(x1, z)ϕ(x2, z) . . . ϕ(xn, z),
Poincare´ made the hypothesis that p observations resulted in the value x1, p resulted
in x2, . . . , p resulted in xn, where p is a fixed and very large integer ([69], p.157).
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The condition requiring the mean to be equal to the expectation can therefore be
written as ∫ +∞
+∞ zψ(z)Φ
p(x1, . . . , xn; z)dz∫ +∞
+∞ ψ(z)Φ
p(x1, . . . , xn; z)dz
=
x1 + · · ·+ xn
n
.
Applying the previous theorem, under the hypothesis that Φ has a unique maximum
in z0, one has z0 as the limit of the left-hand side, which must therefore be equal to
the arithmetic mean x. One is thus brought back to the previous question under the
hypothesis that Φ should be maximal at x. Under the hypothesis that ϕ depends
only on the discrepancies z−xi, Poincare´ again obtained the Gaussian distribution.
It is remarkable that the form of the a priori probability of the phenomenon ψ is
not present in the result. This lack of dependence on the initial hypothesis might
perhaps have been the inspiration for his method of arbitrary functions, described
later.
Poincare´ examined next the general problem by suppressing the constraint that ϕ
depends only on the discrepancies, and obtaind the following form for ϕ
ϕ(x1, z) = θ(x1)e
− ∫ ψ(z)(z−x1)dz
where
∫
ψ(z)(z − x1)dz is the primitive of ψ(z)(z − x1) equal to 0 in x1.
He argued ([69], p.165) that the only reasonable hypothesis was to take ψ = 1 as
there was no reason to believe that the function ϕ, which depends on the observer’s
skillfulness, would depend on ψ, the a priori probability for the value of the measured
quantity. For θ, on the contrary, there was no good reason to suppose it constant (in
which case the Gaussian distribution would be again obtained). Poincare´ took the
example of the meridian observations in astronomy where a decimal error had been
detected in practice: the observers show a kind of predilection for certain decimals
in the approximations.
Poincare´ gave a somewhat intricate justification for focusing on the mean because
it satisfies a practical aspect: as the errors are small, to estimate f(z) by the mean
of the f(xi) was the same as estimating z by the mean of the xi, as immediately
seen by replacing f(x) by its finite Taylor expansion in z,
f(z) + (x− z)f ′(z).
In any case, the major justification was given in the following chapter (Qua-
torzie`me lec¸on, [69], p.167), where the consistency of the estimator x was studied
using an arbitrary law for the error, based on the law of large numbers. After having
recalled the computation of the moments for the Gaussian distribution, Poincare´
implemented the method of moments in the following way. Suppose that y, with
distribution ϕ, admits the same moments as the Gaussian distribution. One then
computes the probable value of e−n(y0−y)
2
, where n is a given integer. Decomposing
e−n(y0−y)
2
=
∞∑
p=0
Apy
2p,
one obtains ∫ +∞
−∞
√
h/pie−hy
2
e−n(y0−y)
2
dy =
∞∑
p=0
Ap E(y2p),
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letting E(y2p) denote the expectation of y2p (the odd moments are naturally equal
to zero), and h a positive constant. The same decomposition is valid by hypothesis
if ϕ replaces the Gaussian distribution in the integral. One has therefore∫ +∞
−∞
√
h/pie−hy
2
e−n(y0−y)
2
dy∫ +∞
−∞ ϕ(y)e
−n(y0−y)2dy
= 1,
and, using his theorem on the limits again, Poincare´ could obtain, letting n tend to
infinity, √
h/pie−hy
2
0 = ϕ(y0).
Now, let us consider again that n measures
x1, . . . , xn
of a quantity z are effectuated, and let us denote by yi = z− xi the individual error
of the i-th measure. Let us suppose that the distribution of an individual error is
arbitrary.
Poincare´ began by justifying the fact of considering the mean
y1 + · · ·+ yn
n
of the n individual errors as error. Indeed, he explained that the mean becomes more
and more probable as the probable value of its square is
1
n
E(y21),
and so, when n becomes large, the probable value of(
y1 + · · ·+ yn
n
)2
tends towards 0 in the sense that the expectation
E[(z − x)2]
tends towards 0 (this is the L2 version of the law of large numbers). As Sheynin
observes ([84], p. 151), Poincare´ made a mistake when he attributed to Gauss this
observation as the latter had never been interested in the asymptotic study of the
error. Poincare´ then used his method of moments in order to prove that the distri-
bution of the mean is Gaussian when the individual errors are centered and do not
have a significant effect on it.
In the 1912 edition [77], Poincare´ significantly added a section ([77], n◦144 pp.
206-208) devoted to a proof of the central limit theorem and obtained a justifica-
tion a posteriori de la loi de Gauss fonde´e sur le the´ore`me de Bernoulli. Poincare´
introduced the characteristic function as
f(α) =
∑
x
pxe
αx
in the finite discrete case, and
f(α) =
∫
ϕ(x)eαxdx
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in the case of a continuous density. In his mind, α was a real or a complex number
and neither the bounds of the sum or the integral, nor the issue of convergence were
mentioned. Poincare´’s considerations on the Fourier and Laplace transforms can
in fact already be largely found in Laplace, though the denomination characteristic
function is Poincare´’s. The Fourier inversion formula was used by Poincare´ since
his lectures on the analytical theory of heat [68] (see in particular the Chapter
6, p.97). As usual, there is no mention of Laplace in Poincare´’s text. Plausibly,
Laplace introduced characteristic functions for probability distributions after having
studied Fourier’s treatise (see [22]). In the absence of proof that Poincare´ knew
Laplace’s method, one may speculate that he had the same kind of illumination as
his predecessor.
Thanks to Fourier’s inversion formula, Poincare´ stated that the characteristic func-
tion determined the distribution. He could thus obtain simply that a sum of inde-
pendent Gaussian variables followed a Gaussian distribution and, by means of a
heuristic and again quite laconic proof, that the error resulting from a large number
of very small and independent partial errors10 was Gaussian. It seems difficult to
award the status of a proof of the central limit theorem to these few lines, a proof
published some ten years later in works by Lindeberg and Le´vy ([51], [50]). Besides,
in this intriguing but rather hasty complement, Poincare´ showed his complete ig-
norance of the Russian research on limit theorems (Cˇebycˇev, Markov et Lyapunov)
which produced some well established versions of the theorem.
In the sixteenth chapter of [69], (n◦147 of the second edition [77] p.211), Poincare´
the physicist still had reservations about what would be an indiscriminate use of
the theories he had just described, which depended so heavily on a mathematical
idealization (the absence of systematic errors, overly smooth hypotheses. . . ). He
wrote, not without irony: ‘I’ve argued the best I could up to now in favor of Gauss’
law.’11 He then focused on the study of exceptional cases and completed his textbook
wit a detailed examination of the method of least squares; on these subjects, I refer
the interested reader to the already quoted paper by Sheynin ([84]).
2.4 The great invention: the method of arbitrary functions
Although Poincare´ is rightly considered to be the father of conventionalism in scien-
tific philosophy, it would be simplistic to think that this position covers all Poincare´’s
philosophy of research. Admittedly, from the very beginning, the latter had repeated
that any use of probability must be based on the choice of a convention one had to
justify. Thus, if one throws a die, one is generally led to take as a convention the
attribution of a probability of 1/6 for each face to appear. However all the arguments
used to justify this convention do not have the same value, and choosing well among
them is also part of a sound scientific process. We cannot indeed be satisfied with
common sense: Bertrand amused himself, when he constructed his famous paradoxes
about the choice of a chord in a circle, in showing that the result depended so closely
on the chosen convention that it lost meaning, and that the calculus of probability
in such situations was reduced to a more or less ingenious arithmetic. The risk was
to condemn the calculus of probability altogether as a vain science and conclude
that our instinct obscur had deceived us ([70], p.262).
10‘[. . . ] re´sultante d’un tre`s grand nombre d’erreurs partielles tre`s petites et inde´pendantes.’ ([77], p.208)
11‘J’ai plaide´ de mon mieux jusqu’ici en faveur de la loi de Gauss.’
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And yet, wrote Poincare´, without this obscure instinct science would be impossible.
How can one reconcile the irreconcilable?
Until then, common practice was to cite Laplace and use the principle of insuffi-
cient reason as a supporting argument. A dubious argument in fact, as in practice it
amounts to assigning a value to the probability only by supposing that the different
possible cases are equally probable, since we do not have any reason to assert the
contrary. How could a scientist such as Poincare´, who was looking for a reasonably
sound basis for using the mathematics of randomness, be satisfied with such a vicious
circle?
Let us observe in passing that he was far from the first to deal with such a question.
And besides, we have already seen that after Laplace’s death, several weaknesses of
his approach had been underlined: the vicious circle of the definition of probability
by possibility, the absence of an answer to the general question of the nature of the
probabilities of causes when applying Bayes’s principle, let alone the confusions in
ill-considered applications, in particular the judicial ones that we have already men-
tioned. . . . A substitute was sought for Laplace’s theory. This problem of defining
the natural value of probabilities had in particular obsessed German psychologists
and physiologists throughout the second half of the 19th century ([46]). Von Kries in
particular succeeded, a good ten years before Poincare´, in constructing the founda-
tions of a method allowing one to justify the attribution of equal probabilities to the
different outcomes of a random experiment repeated a large number of times ([45]).
Poincare´, without question, completely ignored these works, all the more because
they did not belong stricto sensu to the sphere of mathematics.
The question thus for Poincare´ was to show that in some important cases, one
may consider that the equiprobability of the issues in a random experiment as the
result not only of common sense but also of mathematical reasoning, and thereby
to avoid the criticism of Laplace’s principle.
The idea developed by Poincare´, as earlier by von Kries, was that the repetition of
the experiment a large number of times ends in a kind of asymptotic equilibrium, in
a compensation, so that the hypothesis of equiprobability becomes reasonable even
if one absolutely ignores the initial situation.
As early as the 1780s, Laplace observed that in many cases the initial distribution
asymptotically vanishes when one repeatedly applies Bayes’ method. For comple-
ments, the interested reader may consult Stigler’s translation and commentary of
Laplace ([86]), and also [20], p.144. At the end of his paper [63], Poincare´ briefly
mentioned that the convention he had adopted to define the probability concept in
the study of the stability of the three-body problem was by no means necessary:
the result (a probability equal to zero for non-recurrent trajectories) remains true
whatever the convention. Poincare´’s aim in subsequent papers was to show that in
more general situations, the knowledge of the probability distribution at the origin
of time is not needed, as this distribution is not present in the final result. Two ex-
amples serve repeatedly as an illustration in the various texts ([70], [75] especially)
in which he discussed his method: the uniform distribution of the so-called small
planets on the Zodiac and the probabilities for the red and black slots of a roulette
wheel. In [70], p. 266, Poincare´ observed the proximity of these two situations. The
systematic exposition of arbitrary functions as a fundamental method of the the-
ory of probability seems due to Borel ([15], p.114) but the expression me´thode des
fonctions arbitraires was later generally used in the context of Markov chains (see
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in particular [35]).
Let us first follow Poincare´’s comments on the second, and simpler case of roulette
([70], p.267). The ball, thrown with force, stops after having turned many times
around the face of a roulette wheel regularly divided into black and red sectors.
How can we estimate the probability that it stops in a red sector?
Poincare´’s idea is that, when the ball travels for a large number of turns before
stopping, any infinitesimal variation in the initial impulsion can produce a change
in the color of the sector where the ball stops. Therefore, the situation becomes
the same as considering that the face of the game is divided into a large number
of red and black sectors. I make, said Poincare´, the convention that the probability
for this angle to be fall between θ and θ + dθ equals ϕ(θ)dθ, where ϕ is a function
about which I do not know anything (as it depends on the way the ball moved at the
origin of time, an arbitrary function). Poincare´ nevertheless asserts, without any real
justification, that we are naturally led to suppose ϕ is continuous. The probability
that the ball stops in a red sector is the integral of ϕ estimated on the red sectors.
Let us denote by ε the length of a sector on the circumference, and let us consider
a double interval with length 2ε containing a red and a black sector. Let then M and
m be respectively the maximum and the minimum of ϕ on the considered double
interval. As we can suppose that ε is very small, the difference M −m is very small.
And as the difference between the integral on the red sectors and the integral on the
black sectors is dominated by
pi/ε∑
k=1
(Mk −mk)ε,
(where Mk and mk are respectively the maximum and the minimum on each double
interval k of the subdivision of the face with length 2ε), this difference is small and
it is thus reasonable to suppose that both integrals, whose sum equals 1, are equal
to 1/2.
Once again, Poincare´’s writing is somewhat sloppy. He emphasized the importance
of the fact that ε was small with respect to the total swept angle,12 but without
giving much detail on how to interpret this fact. His brevity probably came from
the parallel with the other example we shall now present - but which he studied
earlier in his text.
The expression small planets designates the astero¨ıd belt present between Mars
and Jupiter which had been gradually explored until the end of the 19th century.
The first appearance of questions of a statistical type about these planets seems to go
back to the twelfth chapter of the 1896 textbook ([69], p. 142), where Poincare´ asked
how one can estimate the probable value of their number N . For that purpose, he
implemented a Bayesian method using the a priori probability for an existing small
planet to have been observed, this probability being supposed to have a density f .
It allowed him to carry out the computation of the a posteriori expectation of N .
In [70], Poincare´ was interested in a remarkable phenomenon: the almost uni-
form distribution of the small planets in the different directions of the Zodiac.
Poincare´ looked for arguments justifying this fact ([70], p. 265 et seq.). We know,
said Poincare´, that the small planets follow Kepler’s laws, but on the contrary we
absolutely ignore their initial distribution.
12‘[. . . ] par rapport a` l’angle total parcouru.’
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Let then b be the longitude of a small planet at the initial time, and a its mean
motion. At time t, its longitude is therefore at + b. As already noted, one knows
nothing of the initial distribution and we suppose it is given by an arbitrary func-
tion ϕ(a, b), once more assumed regular in some way: Poincare´ wrote that it was
continuous but in the sequel used it as a function of class C∞.
The mean value of sin(at+ b) is given by∫ ∫
ϕ(a, b) sin(at+ b)dadb.
When t becomes large, this integral becomes close to 0. Poincare´ used successive
integrations by part, with the derivatives of ϕ, whereas he could have used only
continuity and Riemann-Lebesgue’s lemma, but, as we have already seen, Poincare´
did not regard the refinement of his hypotheses as a major concern. A fortiori, for
every nonzero integer n, the integrals∫ ∫
ϕ(a, b) sinn(at+ b) dadb, and
∫ ∫
ϕ(a, b) cosn(at+ b) dadb
are also very small for a large fixed t. Therefore, if one denotes by ψ the probability
density of the longitude at time t, one has for every n ≥ 1,∫
[0,2pi[
ψ(u) sinnu du, and
∫
[0,2pi[
ψ(u) cosnu du
very close to 0. The Fourier expansion of ψ leads to the conclusion that ψ is almost
constant, that is to say, that the longitude of a small planet is roughly uniformly
distributed on the Zodiac.
2.5 Cards shuﬄing
If the example of the small planets illustrates sensitivity to initial conditions, that
of kinetic gas theory is connected with the complexity of causes. The number of
molecules is so large, and they collide in so many ways, that it is impossible to con-
sider the system they form as simply describable by classical mechanics. In 1902 the
first textbook was published expounding the basic principles of statistical mechan-
ics, written by Gibbs ([37]). It developed two main applications for the new theory:
in addition to the kinetic theory of gases, it introduced the situation of mixing two
liquids (a drop of ink put in a glass of water) in order to present the evolution of
a system towards equilibrium. Hadamard, in 1906, had written a review of Gibb’s
book for the Bulletin des sciences mathe´matiques ([38]). In order to illustrate this
mixing situation, he invented the ingenious metaphor of the shuﬄing of a pack of
cards by a gambler evolving towards an equal distribution of the possible permuta-
tions of the cards. Hadamard however did not propose any mathematical treatment
of the question and it was Poincare´, in the paper he published in 1907 in Borel’s
journal ([75] republished later in [76] and [77]), which first analyzed the problem.
He restricted himself in fact to the simplest case, that of two cards. Let us suppose,
said Poincare´, that one has a probability p that after one permutation, the cards are
still in the same order as before the permutation, and q = 1− p that their order is
reversed. Let us consider there are n successive permutations and that the gambler
who shuﬄes the cards earns a payoff S equal to 1 franc if the order after these n
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permutations is unchanged, and -1 franc if it is reversed. A direct computation of
the expectation shows that
E(S) = (p− q)n,
as, in a modern formulation, S can be written as
n∏
i=1
Xi
with the Xi = ±1 independent with distribution (p, q) representing the fact that the
i-th permutation has changed or not the order of the cards. Hence, except in the
trivial cases p = 0 or 1, E(S)→ 0 when n tends towards infinity, which amounts to
saying that the two states +1 and -1, and therefore the two possible orders, tend to
become equiprobable. It is interesting that Poincare´ was inspired, for the recursive
computation of the expectation without first looking for the distribution of S, by
several computations of expectations he found in Chapter III of Bertrand’s book [9].
As mentioned by Poincare´, the tendency to uniformity remained true whatever
the number of cards but the de´monstration serait complique´e. One may suppose
that in 1907 Poincare´ already had the idea of the proof for the general case of n
cards but he wrote it only for the second edition of his textbook of probability
in 1912, in the first section of a chapter added to the book, entitled Questions
diverses. Curiously, Poincare´’s method of proof, contrary to what he had done in
the case of two cards, was not inspired by probabilistic reasoning but was connected
to the theory of groups. Though the Perron-Frobenius theory was already available
(but probably unknown to Poincare´), Poincare´ referred to older works by Frobenius
published in the Sitzungsberichte of Berlin Academy between 1896 and 1901, and
by Elie Cartan [24] that he had himself extended in his paper [72] (consult [83] and
[25] for details). We shall see in the next part that this non-probabilistic aspect did
not escape Borel, who proposed an alternative approach. As for card shuﬄing, it
enjoyed a spectacular renewed interest in the 1920s.
3 Third part: an uneven heritage
We now tackle the heritage of Poincare´’s ideas about randomness and probabil-
ity. This is an intricate question. Indeed, Poincare´ cannot be considered as a full
probabilist in the spirit of mathematicians of later generations like Paul Le´vy and
Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov. As we have already mentioned, these studies on
probability constitute only a very small island in the ocean of the mathematician’s
production. Moreover, it is rather difficult to locate a very precise result, a theorem,
concerning the theory of probability which can be specifically credited to Poincare´.
His primary goal was to refine already existing results or to explore new aspects and
new questions while not feeling compelled to give them a complete structure. We
should again repeat here that in this domain more than any other, it was above all
Poincare´ whom Poincare´ sought to convince, and therefore his works dealing with
probability, including his philosophical texts, often take on a rambling tone, written
following his train of thought, often slightly verbose, illustrating Picard’s opinion
(as reported by K. Popoff): he ignored the adage pauca sed matura13. As Bru notes
13‘Il ne connaissait pas l’adage pauca sed matura.’ ([80], p. 89)
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([20], p. 155), everyone at that time had read Poincare´. But one has the impression
that few understood what he wrote about probability.
3.1 Borelian path
E´mile Borel was unquestionably the main exception. Not only did he read and un-
derstand Poincare´, but he was poised to make the subject his own in a spectacular
way, so much so that he may be regarded as the first French probabilist of the twen-
tieth century. We shall examine how this passing of the baton took place between
the master and his young disciple.
It must firstly be said that this probabilistic turn of E´mile Borel was one of the
most singular changes one could observe in a mathematician around 1900. After
initiating a profound transformation of methods in the theory of functions, Borel
became a star of mathematical analysis in France. Nothing seemed to predispose him
to take the plunge and to devote important efforts to study, refine and popularize the
calculus of probability whose dubious reputation in the mathematical community -
on which we commented above - might have led to rebuke. The context of Borel’s
turn since 1905, the date of publication of his first work in this domain, has been
studied in detail several times, for instance in the papers [32] and [59]. The main
difference which can be found between the discovery of probability by Poincare´ and
by Borel is that, for the latter, it arose from reflections within the mathematical
field and more specifically by considerations on the status of mathematical objects
- in particular about real numbers. In Borel, during the years just preceding 1900,
we note indeed a greater and greater distance from Cantorian romanticism and its
absolutist attitude, as emphasized by Anne-Marie De´caillot in her beautiful book
on Cantor and France ([31], p. 159). Borel gradually replaced this idealistic vision,
which no longer satisfied him, by a realism colored by a healthy dose of pragmatism:
the probabilistic approach appeared then to Borel as an adequate means by which
to confront various forms of reality: mathematical reality first and then physical
reality and practical reality. . . .
The best synthesis summing up Borel’s spirit about the quantification of random-
ness can be found in Cavaille`s’ text [27] published in the Revue de Me´taphysique
et de Morale; it should be seen, at least in part, as a commentary on Borel’s essay
on the interpretation of probabilities [18] that completed the great enterprise of the
Traite´ du Calcul des Probabilite´s et de ses Applications begun in 1922. As Cavaille`s
lyrically put it ([27], p.154), probabilities appear to be the only privileged access to
the path of the future in a world which is no longer equipped with the sharp edges
of certainty, but presents itself instead as a hazy realm of approximations. Borel, at
the moment of his probabilistic turn thirty years earlier, expressed himself similarly
when he asserted that a coefficient of probability constituted the clearest answer
to many questions, an answer which corresponded to an absolutely tangible reality,
and when he was ironic about reluctant spirits who preferred certainty, and who
would perhaps also prefer that 2 plus 2 make 5.14
I refer the reader to the aforementioned studies for precise details on these ques-
tions. What I would like to consider here is how Borel had combined his research
on calculus of probability with the considerations of his predecessor. From his very
first paper, Borel announced that he adopted the conventionalism of Poincare´ ([13],
14‘[. . . ] peut-eˆtre aussi que 2 et 2 fissent 5.’
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p.123 ). But his aim was to illustrate the role that the (then novel) Lebesgue integral
and measure theory could play, after he discovered with amazement their use in [95]
by the Swedish mathematician Anders Wiman (on this subject, see [32]).
‘The methods adopted by Mr. Lebesgue allow us to examine [. . . ] ques-
tions of probability that appear inaccessible to the classical methods of
integration. Moreover, in the simpler cases, it suffices to use the theory of
sets I called ‘measurable’, and which Mr. Lebesgue later termed ‘measur-
able (B)’; the first use of this theory of measurable sets for the calculation
of probability is due, I believe, to Mr. Wiman.’15
I shall not deal here with the radical transformations the Lebesgue integral brought
to analysis at the beginning of the twentieth century. For a broad overview, one
consult [41]. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, let us say at least a few
words about Borel’s role in the elaboration of this theory.
In his thesis dealing with questions of the extension of analytic functions, Borel
invented a new concept of analytic extension, more general than that of Weierstrass,
using a great deal of geometric imagination. In the course of his proof, he proved that
a countable subset of an interval can be covered by a sequence of intervals with total
length as small as one wants. This was probably the first appearance of a σ-additivity
argument for the linear measure of sets. In subsequent years, Borel considerably
fleshed out his construction, in particular in his work [12], by introducing the notion
of measurable set and of measure based on σ-additivity. These concepts had however
a limited extension for Borel as he considered only explicit sets obtained by countable
unions and complementary sets, forcing him to make the shaky suggestion that one
should attribute a measure inferior to α to any subset of a measurable set with
measure α.
One had to wait for Lebesgue’s thesis and the publication of his Note [49], in
which he introduced a new conception for integration, for the notion of measurable
set to reach its full power, on which is based the remarkable flexibility of the integral
exploited by Borel in his paper [13]. There he showed in particular how the use of
Lebesgue’s integral can allow one to give meaning to some questions formulated in a
probabilistic way. One of the most simple of these is that of assigning zero probability
to the choice of a rational number when drawing a real number at random from the
interval [0,1]. Let us insist on the fact that for Borel, it was more critical that the
Lebesgue integral give a question meaning, than to provide its answer. We see here
Borel being absolutely in line with Poincare´’s conventionalism, but the choice of
the convention (identifying the probability with the measure of a subset of [0,1]) is
based on mathematical considerations.
However it is above all in his long paper of 1906 on the kinetic theory of gases
([14]) that Borel would fit in Poincare´’s heritage, at the same time introducing new
considerations showing that he was also striking out on his own. He often insisted
on the difference between his approach and that of Poincare´ ([14], p.11, note 2).
Borel’s aim was to provide a genuine mathematical model for Maxwell’s theory in
order to satisfy mathematicians.
15‘Les me´thodes de M. Lebesgue permettent d’e´tudier [...] des questions de probabilite´s qui paraissent inaccessibles
par les proce´de´s d’inte´gration classique. D’ailleurs, dans les cas particuliers les plus simples, il suffira de se servir de
la the´orie des ensembles que j’avais appele´s mesurables et auxquels M. Lebesgue a donne´ le nom de mesurables (B);
l’application de cette the´orie des ensembles mesurables au calcul des probabilite´s a e´te´, a` ma connaissance, faite
pour la premie`re fois par M. Wiman.’ ([13], p. 126)
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‘I would like to address all those who shared Bertrand’s opinion about
the kinetic theory of gases, that the problems of probability are similar to
the problem of finding the captain’s age when you know the height of the
mainmast. If their scruples are somewhat justified in virtue of the fact that
you cannot fault a mathematician for his love of rigor, nevertheless, it does
not seem to me impossible to give them satisfaction. Such is the aim of
the following pages: they do not advance the theory in any real sense from
a physical point of view, but perhaps they will convince numerous math-
ematicians of its interest, and by increasing the number of investigators,
will contribute indirectly to its development. Should this happen, these
pages will not have been useless, independently of the aesthetic interest
inherent to any logical construction.’16
Thus a motivation for Borel’s agenda was that he regarded the various considera-
tions of Poincare´ on kinetic theory as insufficient to convince mathematicians of its
interest. Let us observe in passing that Poincare´, that same year 1906, wrote a new
paper for the Journal de Physique, where he studied the notion of entropy in the
kinetic theory of gases ([74]); there was probably no direct link between Poincare´’s
and Borel’s publications, which treat different questions.
Borel began his paper by returning to one of Poincare´’s major themes: the distri-
bution of the small planets. However, he approached it from a new angle (see below).
He then applied the results he obtained to the construction of a mathematical model
from which Maxwell’s distribution law can be deduced. Borel’s fundamental idea was
that in the phase space where coordinates are the speeds of n molecules, the sum
of squares of these speeds at a given time t is equal (or, more exactly, proportional)
to n times the mean kinetic energy, so that the point representing the system of
the speeds belongs to a sphere with a radius proportional to
√
n. Borel went on to
perform an asymptotic study of the uniform measure on the ball with radius
√
n in
dimension n. I refer the interested reader to [90], [91] et [57] for details, and shall
restrict myself to some comments on the first part of [14], dealing with the small
planets.
Considering a circle on which there are points representing the longitudinal posi-
tion of the small planets, Borel posed the following question: What is the probability
for all the small planets to be situated on the same half-circle fixed in advance? As
Borel noted, if one had perfect knowledge of the positions of the planets, there would
be no reason to invoke probabilities, as one could directly assert whether the event
was realized or not. He argued that it was necessary to restate the question to give it
well-defined probabilistic meaning according to a selected convention. The simplest
convention would be to assume that the probability for each planet on the chosen
half-circle C1 is equal to the probability of being on the complementary half-circle
(and therefore equal to 1/2), and that the different planets are situated indepen-
dently with respect to each other. In this case, naturally, if there are n planets,
the desired result is 1/2n. However, if this independence was more or less tacitly
16‘Je voudrais m’adresser a` tous ceux qui, au sujet de la the´orie cine´tique des gaz, partagent l’opinion de Bertrand
que les proble`mes de probabilite´ sont semblables au proble`me de trouver l’aˆge du capitaine quand on connaˆıt la
hauteur du grand maˆt. Si leurs scrupules sont justifie´s jusqu’a` un certain point parce qu’on ne peut reprocher a` un
mathe´maticien son amour de la rigueur, il ne me semble cependant pas impossible de les contenter.’
‘C’est le but des pages qui suivent : elles ne font faire aucun progre`s re´el a` la the´orie du point de vue physique;
mais elles arriveront peut eˆtre a` convaincre plusieurs mathe´maticiens de son inte´reˆt, et, en augmentant le nombre
de chercheurs, contribueront indirectement a` son de´veloppement. Si c’est le cas, elles n’auront pas e´te´ inutiles,
inde´pendamment de l’inte´reˆt esthe´tique pre´sent dans toute construction logique.’ ([14], p. 10)
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considered by Poincare´, Borel challenged it as being questionable, the planets hav-
ing clearly mutual influences ([14], p. 12), and so he sought to forgo this hypothesis.
Progressively enlarging his initial problem, Borel arrived at the following asymptotic
formulation ([14], p. 15):
Problem C. - Given the mean motions of n small planets to within ε and
their exact initial positions, one denotes by ω the probability that, at a
time t chosen at random in an interval a, b, every corresponding point P is
in C1. What is the limit to which ω tends when the interval a, b increases
indefinitely?17
Borel could then implement a method of arbitrary functions in dimension n with-
out supposing the initial independence of the motions of the planets, and prove that
asymptotically the desired probability was 1/2n, a type of ergodic theorem which
showed an asymptotic independence he would also show in the case of his model for
the kinetic theory of gases having Gaussian distributions as limits. A rather curious
detail is that the result given by Borel, proving the convergence of the uniform distri-
bution on a sphere with radius
√
n in n dimensional space to independent Gaussian
variables, is today called Poincare´’s Lemma, even though it is entirely absent from
the works of Poincare´ (for complements about this strange fact, see [57] and the
references therein).
I have not been able to make out clearly whether Poincare´ was ever interested in
the research and the work of his successor in the field of probability. The only sign
which might indicate at least a passing interest is the fact that he agreed to write
an article entitled “Le hasard” ([75]) for the Revue du Mois. But, to my knowledge,
Poincare´ did not comment on Borel’s work, and what is even more surprising, if one
remembers Poincare´’s work at the beginning of the 1890s, he showed no interest in
measure theory as applied to the mathematics of randomness. Poincare´, here again,
stood poised on the threshold of a domain he helped to create, but did not enter.
3.2 Markovian descent
In order to complete this outline of Poincare´’s probabilistic heritage, let us finally
consider what may have been the most amazing consequence of his work: the dazzling
development, since the end of the 1920s, of the theory of Markov chains and Markov
processes. This story has already been set out in several texts and I shall again
restrict myself to comments on only the most salient points, referring the reader
elsewhere for more information.
We have already evoked Poincare´’s investigations of card shuﬄing and the fact
that in his proof of the convergence to the uniform distribution in [77], he used
an algebraic method with limited exploitation of the probabilistic structure of the
model. Borel, an attentive reader, immediately realized this and wrote a note, asking
Poincare´ to present it to the Academy for the Comptes-Rendus de l’Acade´mie des
Sciences (the only letter from Borel placed online on the website of the Archives
Poincare´ 18).
Borel wrote to his colleague on 29 December 1911:
17‘Proble`me C. - Connaissant a` ε pre`s les moyens mouvements des n petites plane`tes et connaissant exactement
leurs positions initiales, on de´signe par ω la probabilite´ pour qu’a` une e´poque t choisie arbitrairement dans un
intervalle a, b tous les points P correspondants soient sur C1. Quelle est la limite vers laquelle tend ω lorsque
l’intervalle a, b augmente inde´finiment?’ ([14], p. 15)
18http://www.univ-nancy2.fr/poincare/chp/
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‘I have just read the book you kindly sent me; I do not need to tell you
how much the new sections interested me, in particular your theory of card
shuﬄing. I tried to render it accessible to those unfamiliar with complex
numbers, and it seems to me that in doing so I reached a slightly more
general proposition. If it is new, and if you find it interesting, I would ask
you to communicate the attached note.19
Poincare´ acted immediately and the note was presented on 2 January 1912. Borel’s
method in [16] was in fact an extension of the elementary one used by Poincare´ to
treat the case of two cards, where one looks at the evolution of the successive means
in the course of time. This method later became the standard in proofs of the
exponential convergence of an irreducible finite Markov chain towards its stationary
distribution (see for instance [10], p.131). Here the stationary distribution is uniform
due to the reversible character of the chain. Borel even gave himself the satisfaction
of introducing a dependence on time (the chain becoming inhomogeneous).
He considered the regular case where there exists an ε such that, at every moment,
the transition probabilities of one permutation to another at a subsequent time are
all greater than some ε. In Borel’s notation, let pj,n be the probability of the j-th
possible permutation of the cards before the n-th operation. Denoting by αj,h,n the
probability for Ah to be replaced by Aj during the n-th operation, one has
pj,n+1 =
h=k∑
h=1
αj,h,nph,n
with the constraint
∑k
h=1 αj,h,n = 1 where k denotes the number of possible permu-
tations. Let us immediately observe that Pn and pn, the largest and the smallest of
the pj,n, form two sequences, respectively nonincreasing and nondecreasing. Let P
and p denote their limits. For a given η > 0, one may choose n for which Pn ≤ P +η,
and therefore the pj,n are inferior to P + η. After N operations one can write
pj,n+N =
h=k∑
h=1
βj,h,nph,n ,
h=k∑
h=1
βj,h,n = 1
where the β. are the transition probabilities between time n and time n + N , each
being greater than ε by hypothesis.
Let us consider the smallest of the ph,n, ph0,n so that pn = ph0,n ≤ p. For the sake
of simplicity, let us denote by β its coefficient βj,h0,n; by hypothesis, β ≥ ε. Let us
observe that
∑h=k
h=1,h6=h0 βj,h,n = 1− β. Therefore, one can write, by choosing j such
that pj,n+N is superior or equal to P ,
P ≤ pj,n+N ≤ βp+ (1− β)(P + η) = P + (1− β)η − β(P − p)
and hence
P − p ≤ 1− β
β
η ≤ 1− ε
ε
η.
19‘Je viens de lire le livre que vous avez eu l’amabilite´ de me faire envoyer; je n’ai pas besoin de vous dire combien
les parties neuves m’ont inte´resse´, en particulier votre the´orie du battage. J’ai essaye´ de la mettre a` la porte´e de
ceux qui ne sont pas familiers avec les nombres complexes, et il m’a semble´ que j’obtenais ainsi une proposition un
peu plus ge´ne´rale. Si elle est nouvelle, et si elle vous paraˆıt inte´ressante, je vous demanderai de communiquer la note
ci-jointe.’
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η being arbitrary small, one concludes that P = p and therefore that asymptotically
the pj,n become all equal to 1/k. Let us observe in passing that in these blessed years
when it was permitted to publish mistakes, Borel erred in writing his inequality,
considering ε instead of the number we called β, a fact which naturally did not
change anything in the final result.
Nobody seemed to have paid attention to Borel’s note: when these results were
rediscovered by Le´vy and then Hadamard in the 1920s, neither of them had the
slightest idea of its existence (on this subject see the letters from Le´vy to Fre´chet
[6], pp.137 to 141).
We must next skip five years and cover several hundreds of kilometers east in
order to see a new protagonist coming on stage, the Czech mathematician Bohuslav
Hostinsky´. Moreover, as if it were not enough that we must invoke an unknown
mathematician, we must first say a few words about an unknown philosopher. Indeed
the man who may have been, together with Borel, the most attentive contemporary
reader of Poincare´’s texts on probability was another Czech, the philosopher Karel
Vorovka (1879-1929), whose influence on Hostinsky´ was decisive.
It is not possible here to discuss this singular figure in detail and I shall therefore
restrict myself to giving some elements explaining how he had got involved in this
melting pot. An interesting and very complete study on Vorovka was published
in Czech some years ago [60] and hopefully it will become more accessible in a
more widely known language. Some complements can also be found in [56] and the
references therein. Two reasons explain this general ignorance of Vorovka: the fact
that his works, mostly in Czech, were never translated, and also that his early death
precluded the collection of his ideas in a large-scale work. Placing himself in the
tradition of Bernhard Bolzano (1771-1848), the major figure of the philosophical
scene in Prague during the 19th century, Vorovka sought an approach combining
both his strong mathematical education and a rather strict religious philosophy,
an original syncretism of empiricism and idealism which had close links with the
thought of the hero of the Czechoslovak independence, T.G. Masaryk, and with
American pragmatist philosophy, in which he had much been interested.
Vorovka’s discovery of Poincare´’s philosophical writings at the beginning of the
20th century was a real revelation: he drew from them the conviction that the
scientific discoveries at the end of the 19th century, especially in physics, compelled
a reconsideration of the question of free will. Vorovka showed a real originality in
that he did not content himself with principles, but closely studied the mathematical
problems raised by the theory of probability. He was a diligent reader of Bertrand’s
textbook, of Borel’s texts, but also of Markov’s works, publishing several works
inspired by papers of the Russian mathematician (see [54], [92], [93], [94]). At the
time when he was granted tenure at the Czech University in Prague, around the year
1910, Vorovka met the mathematician Bohuslav Hostinsky´, who had just returned
to Bohemia after a period of research in Paris. In Hostinsky´’s own words (see [44]),
it is through the discussions he had with Vorovka that he learned about Poincare´’s
works, and he began to reflect upon the calculus of probability, a domain somewhat
remote from his original field of research (differential geometry).
Following Jiˇr´ı Bera´nek, who was one of the last assistants to Hostinsky´ after the
Second World War at the University of Brno, another source of the latter’s interest
in the calculus of probability is found in his reading of the 1911 paper by Paul and
Tanya Ehrenfest on Statistical Mechanics for the Encyklopa¨die der Mathematischen
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Wissenschaften, translated and completed by Borel for the French version of the
Encyclope´die des Sciences Mathe´matiques [33].
Bera´nek wrote ([8]) that this paper, whose impact was considerable,
‘put the emphasis on statistical methods in physics, along with geometri-
cal methods, mainly in connection with the works of L. Boltzmann on ki-
netic gas theory. Boltzmann’s work sustained discussions and controversies
concerning the correctness and legitimacy of his mathematical methods.
Hostinsky´, as he mentioned later, began to study Boltzmann’s works in
1915, and to take an interest in the efforts made to provide precise math-
ematical bases for the kinetic theory. The central point of these efforts
implied a reexamination of some fundamental questions of the theory of
probability. Hostinsky´ was especially impressed by the fundamental works
of H. Poincare´ on the bases of probability calculus which opened the way
for new methods necessary for the improvement of kinetic theory. For this
reason, around 1917, Hostinsky´ began to study in earnest questions in the
calculus of probability. . . ’20
The fact that Hostinsky´ began to deal seriously with probability in 1917 is at-
tested by his own diary, kept in the archives of Masaryk’s university in Brno. The
diary’s entries concern only comments on differential geometry until 1917. On 10
January 1917, Hostinsky´ made some observations on the study of card shuﬄing by
Poincare´, following [77], and on January 18th he took up problems of lottery. A first
paper appeared some months later in the Rozpravy Cˇeske´ Akademie dealing with
the problem of Buffon’s needle [43].
The problem of Buffon’s needle is a classic of the calculus of probability and
Hostinsky´ began by expounding it:
‘A cylindrical needle is thrown on a horizontal floor, on which are traced
equidistant parallels; the distance 2a between two successive parallels is
supposed larger than the length 2b of the needle. What is the probability
that the needle meet one of the parallels?’21
Buffon had proposed a solution whose numerical result 2b
pia
, in which pi was present,
was a source of numerous propositions for an ‘experimental’ calculation of pi. But,
in fact, Buffon’s proof was based on the hypothesis that the needle center could
be located anywhere on the plane, and Hostinsky´, in a second critical part of his
paper, mentioned the dubious nature of such an hypothesis, just as Carvallo had
done before him in 1912. An experimental device could only take the form of a table
of limited size, and it is then clear that, depending on the choice of a small square
20‘[. . . ] mettait l’accent sur les me´thodes statistiques en physique, a` coˆte´ des me´thodes ge´ome´triques, princi-
palement en relation avec les travaux de L. Boltzmann sur la the´orie cine´tique des gaz. Sur ceux-ci furent mene´es
discussions et controverses, au sujet de l’exactitude et de la le´gitimite´ des me´thodes mathe´matiques employe´es.
Hostinsky´, comme il l’a lui meˆme mentionne´, commenc¸a a` partir de 1915 a` e´tudier les travaux de Boltzmann et a`
s’inte´resser aux efforts qui e´taient faits pour donner a` la the´orie cine´tique des bases mathe´matiques pre´cises. Le point
central de ceux-ci ne´cessitait un nouvel examen de certaines questions fondamentales de la the´orie des probabilite´s.
Hostinsky´ fut particulie`rement impressionne´ a` ce sujet par les travaux fondamentaux de H. Poincare´ sur les fonde-
ments du calcul des probabilite´s qui ouvraient la voie a` de nouvelles me´thodes ne´cessaires pour le perfectionnement
de la the´orie cine´tique. Pour cette raison, vers 1917, Hostinsky´ commenc¸a a` s’occuper se´rieusement de questions de
calcul des probabilite´s. . . ’
21‘On lance une aiguille cylindrique sur un plan horizontal, ou` sont trace´es des paralle`les e´quidistantes; la distance
2a de deux paralle`les voisines est suppose´e plus grande que la longueur 2b de l’aiguille. Quelle est la probabilite´ pour
que l’aiguille rencontre l’une des paralle`les?’
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C1 at the center of the table or another square C2 on the edge of the table with
the same area, the probability p1 that the center of the needle belongs to C1 and
the probability p2 that it belongs to C2 cannot be the same: indeed, C2 is strongly
subject to the constraint that the needle does not fall from the table, but C1 is very
weakly so constrained, so that intuitively one should have p1 >> p2.
Hostinsky´ therefore considered it indispensable to suppose unknown the a priori
distribution of the localization of the needle. It is an unknown distribution (with
density) f(x, y)dxdy. But, mentioned Hostinsky´, Poincare´ also, in the resolution of
several problems of probability, allowed the use of such an arbitrary density and
observed that in some situations this function would not be present in the final
result. Hostinsky´ proposed to prove that if a domain A of the space is segmented in
m elementary domains with the same volume ε, and containing each a white part
with volume λε and a black part with volume (1 − λ)ε (where 0 < λ < 1), then
for any sufficiently regular function ϕ(x, y, z), the integral on the white parts will
asymptotically (when m tends to infinity) be equal to λ times the integral of ϕ on
A.
Hostinsky´ then applied this result in order to propose a new solution to the problem
of the needle. Instead of Buffon’s unrealistic hypothesis, he supposed that the center
of the needle is compelled to fall in a square with side 2na, n ∈ N, with a density of
probability given by an unknown function ϕ (which he supposed to have bounded
derivatives) and kept on the other hand the second hypothesis concerning the uni-
form distribution of the angle ω of the needle with respect to the parallels. This being
set out, dividing the domain of integration 0 < x < 2na, 0 < y < 2na, 0 < ω < pi
2
in
n2 subdomains (by partitioning the values of x and y with respect to the multiples
of a), each small domain is itself divided into two parts (corresponding to the fact
that the needle intersects [white part] or does not intersect [black part] the corre-
sponding parallel). The ratio of their respective volumes to the total volume of the
subdomain is constant and equal, for the white part, to 2b
pia
. An application of the
previous theorem then allows one to assert that we obtain the desired probability,
at least asymptotically when n tends towards infinity.
In the Spring of 1920, seeking to benefit from the sympathy of French public
opinion towards the young Czechoslovakia, Hostinsky´ had sent to E´mile Picard the
translation of his paper and Picard proposed immediately (18 April 1920) to include
it in the Me´langes of the Bulletin des Sciences Mathe´matiques. This slightly revised
version of the paper of 1917 was published at the end of 1920 and Maurice Fre´chet,
who had just arrived in Strasbourg and considered himself as a missionary [85] read
it with attention, as he mentioned in a subsequent letter to Hostinsky´, dated 7
November 1920, in which he congratulated him on having obtained such a positive
result.
As we have just explained, following Poincare´’s example, Hostinsky´ required that
the function ϕ admit a uniformly bounded derivative in the domain A in order to
obtain an upper bound for the difference between the maximum and the minimum
of ϕ on each of the small domains. But Fre´chet, when he read the paper, rightly
realized that as only an estimation of the integrals of ϕ on these domains was needed,
the simultaneous convergence of the superior and inferior Darboux sums towards the
integral of ϕ allowed one to obtain the desired result with ϕ Riemann-integrable.
This is what he wrote, together with the proof, to Hostinsky´ on 7 November 1920.
It seems that the former letter refers to Fre´chet’s initial research on probabilistic
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questions. It was subsequently published in a short note in 1921 ([34]). Hostinsky´ an-
swered on 22 December 1920, agreeing with Fre´chet that the integration hypothesis
was sufficient. He also mentioned that Borel had already suggested that Poincare´’s
hypothesis could be weakened, supposing only the function to be continuous. In his
textbook on probability published in 1909 by Hermann [15], in which Borel devoted
the whole of Chapter VIII to the introduction of arbitrary functions by consid-
ering both Poincare´’s examples of the roulette wheel and of the small planets on
the Zodiac, Borel noted that the hypothesis of continuity was sufficient to apply
Poincare´’s method. Fre´chet was to include Hostinsky´’s observation in his note in
1921 [34] (where he emphasized that it had been inspired by the latter after having
read his paper on Buffon’s needle). In [34], he mentioned Borel’s work to emphasize
that hypotheses of both continuity (Borel) and derivability (Poincare´) were useless
and that Riemann-integrability was sufficient.
His friendly relationship with Fre´chet encouraged Hostinsky´ to continue his prob-
abilistic studies, and this leads us eventually to the last step of this long journey,
introducing Jacques Hadamard (1865-1963). The presence of this name in our story
may seem quite strange, and, in fact, Hadamard was interested in probabilities only
during one semester of the academic year 1927-1928. He had never considered them
before, and would never do so again, showing even some irritation towards Le´vy,
one of the disciples of whom he was most fond, when he ‘wasted’ his mathematical
talent in the 1920s and left the royal path of functional analysis for the calculus of
probability.
Following Poincare´’s example, Hadamard always kept in mind physical theories
from which he intended to extract new mathematical problems. It was from this
perspective that he had written the aforementioned review of Gibbs’ book in 1906.
When Hadamard began writing up his course of analysis at the E´cole Polytech-
nique in the 1920s (published by Hermann in two volumes in 1926 and 1930), he had
to prepare some lectures in 1927 on probability theory, and he took up Poincare´’s ex-
ample of card shuﬄing. On this occasion, he recovered Borel’s method of successive
means and published in 1927 a note in the Comptes-Rendus de l’Acade´mie des sci-
ences de Paris [39]. Soon after that, Hostinsky´ discovered Hadamard’s note and sent
an extension of it for publication in the Comptes-Rendus [42], which appeared in the
first weeks of 1928. There, for the first time, before everyone - except for Bachelier,
but, alas, who had ever read Bachelier among the mathematicians I write about!
- and especially before Kolmogorov, Hostinsky´ introduced a Markovian model in
continuous time. At the Bologna congress in September 1928, it was realized that
Poincare´’s card-shuﬄing studies were in fact a special case of the model of variables
in chain introduced by Markov in 1906, and developed in several of his posterior
publications as well as by Bernstein in 1926, but which were largely ignored out-
side Russia. The attention this drew, in particular at the Congress in Bologna in
1928, inaugurated intense activity on these questions which continued throughout
the 1930s, a story brilliantly recounted in [20] to which I refer the interested reader.
This unexpected crowning of Poincare´’s efforts seems to be a perfect moment to
take leave of the master.
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Conclusion
Poincare´ lived during that very specific moment in the history of science when
randomness, in a more and more insistent way, challenged the beautiful deterministic
edifice of Newton’s and Laplace’s cosmology which had dominated scientific thinking
for centuries. A conference by Paul Langevin in 1913 [48] shows the extent of this
challenge, paralleling the introduction of probabilities and a drastic change in our
comprehension of the structural laws of matter. Such a penetrating mind as Poincare´
could not have lived this irruption otherwise than as a traumatic one, that he had
to face with the means he had at his disposal. These means, as we saw, had not yet
reached the degree of power necessary to deal with many problems raised by modern
physics. Let us recall one of the master’s apothegms:
‘Physics gives us not only an occasion for problem solving: it helps us find
the means of solution, and in two ways. It points us in the direction of the
solution, and suggests how to reason our way there.’22
And the new physical theories with which Poincare´ was confronted suggested
developing the theory of probability in the first place - a suggestion which can
be also found, but in a slightly different perspective, among the problems Hilbert
expounded during the Paris Congress of 1900. Therein lies the apparent paradox
which puzzled the mathematician at the turn of the century: the hesitation and
reluctance in the face of problems raised by statistical mechanics, the somewhat
uncertain attempts to give solid bases to the theory of probability, the seemingly
limited taste for new mathematical techniques, in particular measure theory and
Lebesgue’s integration, though they could have provided decisive tools to tackle
numerous problems. Poincare´, as we said, remained a man of the 19th century,
maybe in the same way as Klein had mischievously presented Gauss as a scientist
of the 18th century. Naturally, in Gauss’s case, the irony came from the fact that he
had lived two thirds of his life in the 19th century, whereas death surprised Poincare´
at the beginning of the 20th century. But we may speculate - although not here! - on
the manner in which our hero would have adapted to transformations in the scientific
world picture. We have seen that, following the example of his glorious predecessor,
Poincare´ sowed widely, and the spectacular blossoms of many of his ideas inspired
countless researchers after his death. As for probabilities, I think one can sum up
the measure of his influence as follows: he began to extract the domain from the
grey zone to which it had been confined by almost all French mathematicians, he
initiated methods that flourished when they integrated more powerful mathematical
theories, he convinced Borel of the importance of certain questions, to the study of
which he eventually devoted an enormous amount of energy. For a rather marginal
subject in Poincare´’s works, such a contribution appears far from negligible.
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